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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
                     
1
       The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge for 
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
3 
 We are asked to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment to 
the United States Constitution bars a federal court from 
considering an age discrimination claim against the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor and Industry 
("Commonwealth"), that was acting in its capacity as an 
"employment agency" under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., when the alleged 
discrimination occurred.  We must also determine whether the 
Eleventh Amendment bars an equitable award of "front pay" against 
the Commonwealth and its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Because we conclude that Congress has not abrogated the Eleventh 
Amendment's grant of constitutional immunity to states while 
acting as employment agencies under the ADEA, we will affirm the 
district court's finding that plaintiffs' ADEA claims are barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment.  Furthermore, because we conclude that 
plaintiffs' equitable "front pay" claims under § 1983 seek 
monetary compensation to remedy a past wrong, we will affirm the 
district court's finding that the Eleventh Amendment bars those 
claims.  Finally, we conclude that plaintiffs' remaining 
declaratory and injunctive claims under § 1983 have been rendered 
moot.  
 
I. 
 The facts relevant to this appeal are easily summarized.  In 
January 1988, the United States Steel Corporation ("USX") placed 
its Vandergrift, Pennsylvania plant in an idled status and 
stopped manufacturing or shipping products from the facility. 
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Allegheny Ludlum Corporation ("Allegheny Ludlum") negotiated with 
USX and purchased the plant in June, 1988.  In order to initially 
staff the facility, Allegheny Ludlum decided to hire fifty-five 
hourly employees from amongst the 125 who had previously worked 
at the plant.  Accordingly, Allegheny Ludlum entered into an 
agreement with the United Steelworkers of America ("USWA") 
pursuant to which Allegheny Ludlum established a preferential 
hiring list for former Vandergrift employees who were USWA 
members (the "Agreement"). The Agreement gave Allegheny Ludlum 
the absolute right to select and assign thirty of the initial 
fifty-five hires.  The remaining twenty-five were to be selected 
on the basis of continuous service, provided that they 
demonstrated the requisite skills for anticipated tasks. 
 The Job Services offices of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
function as a no-fee employment service to bring employers and 
job seekers together.  The offices administer a General Aptitude 
Test Battery ("GATB") for use in referring applicants to 
cooperating companies that are looking for workers.  The GATB 
consists of twelve separately timed tests which purportedly 
measure a broad range of occupationally relevant cognitive, 
perceptual and psychomotor skills.  In June 1988, Allegheny 
Ludlum requested the New Kensington and Kittanning Job Services 
offices to accept applications and administer GATB tests to those 
individuals on its preferential hiring list.   
 The instant litigation arose when a group of former USX 
employees over the age of forty filed a civil action for damages, 
declaratory and injunctive relief against Allegheny Ludlum, the 
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USWA and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Labor 
and Industry, its Secretary and various employees ("the 
Commonwealth").  The Complaint alleged that the staffing of the 
Vandergrift facility violated the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216 et seq.; the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq.; the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 1985; the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951, et 
seq.; and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Plaintiffs brought suit as a 
class action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).2  The complaint alleged 
                     
2
     
1
  The class action was brought ". . .on behalf of all 
other persons similarly situated who are at least 40 years old 
who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by the 
Defendants' unlawful age discrimination in employment policies 
and practices. The 'Class' which Plaintiffs seek to represent, 
and of which Plaintiffs are themselves members, is composed and 
defined as follows: 
  All persons, male and female, now named or hereafter 
  executing and filing written consents to participate 
  and join in this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), 
  who were, at any time from on or about 1987-1988 to  
  date: 
  (a)  at least 40 years of age; 
  (b)  employed by USX at its. . .facility in 
Vandergrift, 
   Pennsylvania; which plant was sold to Allegheny 
   Ludlum; 
  (c)  subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and 
   represented by the USWA; 
  (d)  involuntarily retired and/or not employed at  
   Allegheny Ludlum for age motivated reasons; 
  (e)  subjected to such adverse employment actions as 
   described infra in connection with the Allegheny 
   Ludlum manning program for Vandergrift and nearby 
   facilities. . ."  Complaint, ¶ 8. 
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that the defendants' had discriminated against the employees in 
the class on the basis of age by administering the GATB.  
 Following discovery, plaintiffs entered a sealed settlement 
agreement and stipulated to the dismissal of all claims against 
Allegheny Ludlum and the USWA.  The remaining Commonwealth 
defendants then moved for summary judgment based upon the 
sovereign immunity enjoyed by the Job Services offices of the 
Commonwealth under the Eleventh Amendment.3  The district court 
granted the Commonwealth's motion based upon sovereign immunity, 
and ruled that plaintiffs' remaining injunctive and declaratory 
claims against the Commonwealth had been rendered moot by the 
settlement agreement with Allegheny Ludlum and the USWA.  This 
appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Dismissal of an action based upon sovereign immunity is 
subject to plenary review by this Court.  Fitchik v. New Jersey 
Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989), cert 
                                                                  
 Unlike a Rule 23 class action, a 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) class 
action does not bind those who fit within the class description 
unless they opt in.  Title 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) permits the use of 
a 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) opt-in class action in ADEA cases. 
   
3
       Although defendants brought their Eleventh Amendment 
objection by way of a motion for summary judgment under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b), the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional 
bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 
See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-
100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 906-07, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).  Accordingly, 
the motion may properly be considered a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).   
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denied, 493 U.S. 850, 110 S.Ct. 148, 107 L.Ed.2d 107 (1989).  The 
district court's decision that this case is moot is also subject 
to plenary review.  Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 
939 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
III.   
   A.      
 The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that: 
 The Judicial power of the United States shall not be  
 construed to extend to any suit in law or equity 
 commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United 
 States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
 or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XI.  The Amendment has been interpreted to 
protect an unconsenting state from "suit in federal court by its 
own citizens as well as those of another state."  Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907-08, 79 
L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 
33 L.Ed. 842 (1890).   
 There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.  Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 
L.Ed.2d 171 (1985).  If a state waives its immunity and consents 
to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the 
action.  See e.g., Id. at 234, 105 S.Ct. at 3142; Clark v. 
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447, 2 S.Ct. 878, 883, 27 L.Ed. 780 
(1883).  Moreover, Congress may specifically abrogate the states' 
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Eleventh Amendment immunity.  See e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 
427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (finding 
abrogation in legislation passed pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 
U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d. 1 (1989) (finding abrogation 
in legislation passed pursuant to the Congress' Article I, § 8 
plenary power over commerce).  Here, appellants contend that 
Congress specifically abrogated the sovereign immunity of states 
and all state agencies in amending the ADEA, and that the 
Eleventh Amendment therefore presents no bar to their ADEA claim 
against the Commonwealth.  However, the plain language of the 
ADEA defeats this argument.  
 Two conditions must be met before we can decide that 
Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
enacting or amending the ADEA.  First, the congressional 
legislation in question must articulate an unequivocal 
congressional intention to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the 
states.  Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 
2401, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989); Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3146-47, 87 L.Ed.2d 
171 (1985).  On more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has 
said that Congress "must express its intention to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute 
itself."  Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 3148; 
Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230, 109 S.Ct. at 2401 ("[E]vidence of 
congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual."). "In 
traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the 
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federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that 
the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into 
issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision."  
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 
L.Ed.2d 488 (1971).  Second, the Constitution must give Congress 
the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
The party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden 
of proving its applicability.  Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Comm., 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1994).   The Supreme Court has 
yet to determine if Congress possesses the power to abrogate the 
states' historic Eleventh Amendment immunity when neither 
legislating to enforce the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor acting to regulate interstate commercial activity 
under the Commerce Clause.   
 Here, we have no trouble resolving the second part of this 
inquiry as the Supreme Court has held the ADEA to be a valid 
exercise of Congress' plenary power to regulate interstate 
commerce under the Commerce Clause.  See  EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U.S. 226, 243, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1064, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983). 
Moreover, virtually every court which has addressed the question 
has concluded that the ADEA was validly enacted pursuant to 
Congress' power to enforce section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See e.g., Hurd v. Pittsburg State University, 821 
F.Supp. 1410, 1413 (D.Kan. 1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 564, 565 (10th 
Cir.), cert denied __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 321, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 
(1994); Bell v. Purdue University, 975 F.2d 422, 425 n.5 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Davidson v. Bd. of Gov. of State Coll. & Univ., 920 
10 
F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire 
Service, 715 F.2d 694, 700 (1st Cir. 1983) Arritt v. Grisell, 567 
F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); ; Swanson v. Dept. of Health, 
773 F.Supp. 255, 258 (D.Colo. 1991); but see, Black v. Goodman, 
736 F.Supp. 1042, 1045 (D.Mont. 1990).   
 The ADEA, as amended in 1974, makes it unlawful for an 
"employer" to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual because of such individual's 
age.  29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 626(b)-(c).  The Act defines the 
term "employer" to include "a State or political subdivision of a 
State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political 
subdivision of a State," 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2), and explicitly 
provides that an "employer" who violates the Act is liable for 
legal and equitable relief.   
 Unless Congress had said in so many words that it was 
 abrogating the states' sovereign immunity in age 
 discrimination cases--and that degree of explicitness 
 is not required, (citations omitted) --it could not 
     have made its desire to override the states' 
     sovereign immunity clearer. 
 
Davidson, 920 F.2d at 443.   
The statute simply leaves no room to dispute whether states and 
state agencies are included among the class of potential 
defendants when sued under the ADEA for their actions as 
"employers." 
    However, that does not end our inquiry.  Plaintiffs agree 
that any ADEA liability in the instant action arises because the 
Commonwealth was acting as an "employment agency," and not in the 
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capacity of an "employer" in administering the GATB.  The ADEA 
defines an "employment agency" as "any person regularly 
undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for 
an employer and includes an agent of such person; but shall not 
include an agency of the United States."  29 U.S.C. § 630(c).   
Accordingly, we must decide whether the Eleventh Amendment bars 
ADEA claims brought against a State while acting in its capacity 
as an employment agency.  This question is one of first 
impression for this Court, and our research reveals only one 
other court to have directly addressed the issue.4   
 In 1974, Congress explicitly expanded the ADEA definition of 
"employer" to include "a State or political subdivision of a 
State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political 
subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2).  However, at the 
same time, Congress failed to similarly expand the statutory 
definition of "employment agency."  Congress merely amended that 
language by deleting the italicized portion below: 
 (c) the term "employment agency" means any person  
 undertaking with or without compensation to procure 
 employees for an employer and includes an agent of such 
 person; but shall not include an agency of the United 
 States or an agency of a State or political subdivision 
 of a State, except that such term shall include the  
 United States Employment Service and the system of State 
 and local employment services receiving Federal assistance. 
 
                     
4
       Here, the district court relied on its own precedent in 
Radeschi v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 846 F.Supp. 416 
(W.D.Pa. 1993).  In Radeschi, the district court dismissed the 
ADEA claim of a job applicant who sued the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania after the state employment agency refused to refer 
him as a result of an aptitude test.  The court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment bar remained in place for the Commonwealth 
while acting in its capacity as an employment agency.  846 
F.Supp. at 421.     
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Act of April 8, 1974, Pub.L. 93-259, 1974 U.S.C.A.A.N. (93 Stat.) 
78 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630).  In effect, Congress simply 
deleted the language explicitly excluding state employment 
agencies from the reach of the ADEA.  At the same time, however, 
Congress failed to specifically include state actors within the 
definition of "employment agency."  Moreover, Congress failed to 
expressly incorporate state actors into the definition of 
"person" used in 29 U.S.C. § 630.  Section 630(a) of the ADEA 
defines "person" as "one or more individuals, partnerships, 
associations, labor organizations, corporations, business trusts, 
legal representatives, or any organized group of persons." 
Accordingly, the intent of Congress to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment immunity of states while acting as employment agencies 
is not clear.  Congress certainly could have amended the 
definition of "employment agency" in the same manner that it so 
clearly amended "employer" in 29 U.S.C. § 630.  We can only 
assume that Congress's failure to do so was significant.          
 Appellants contend that it is hardly conceivable that 
Congress, having fully extended ADEA liability to the states, 
would carve out a special immunity for states while engaging in 
employment services.  Such a result, they suggest, would not only 
be illogical but unjustifiable on policy grounds.  Furthermore, 
appellants point out that state employment agencies are held 
liable for discriminatory practices under the closely analogous 
statutory framework of Title VII, and they therefore urge us to 
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be guided by those cases that have decided this issue under Title 
VII.5  
 These arguments, though well-reasoned, miss the point.  Our 
inquiry here is severely limited, and we must find congressional 
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity solely from "the 
unmistakable language of the statute itself."  Atascadero 473 
U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 3148.  Accordingly, our analysis can 
not expand to encompass the analogy and policy considerations 
that plaintiffs now urge upon us.  Though one may question the 
policy justifications for furnishing a special statutory immunity 
to states while engaged in employment services, the ADEA's 
treatment of the question is, at best, ambiguous.  The 
limitations of Atascadero, and our traditional constraints 
against acting as a "super legislature" preclude us from reading 
language into this statute that Congress did not enact, and may 
well not have intended.  See e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) 
("[T]he judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the 
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made 
in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along 
suspect lines."); see also, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
                     
5
       Title VII defines an "employment agency" as "any person 
regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure 
employment for an employer or to procure for employees 
opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of 
such a person."  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c).  A "person" is 
specifically defined to include "governments, governmental 
agencies. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).  Thus, Congress has made it 
"unmistakably clear" that no Eleventh Amendment immunity exists 
for governmental employment agencies and services, state or 
federal, under Title VII. 
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479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1964).             
 The statutory language of the ADEA simply does not evince an 
unmistakably clear intention to abrogate the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit while acting in their capacity as 
employment agencies under that Act.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the district court's holding that plaintiffs' ADEA claims against 
the Commonwealth are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.     
 
B. 
 Plaintiffs also brought suit against the Commonwealth and 
various of its officials, acting within the scope their official 
capacities, for equal protection and due process violations under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Plaintiffs alleged that the Commonwealth's 
administration of the "arbitrary and discriminatory" GATB posed 
an unconstitutional bar to employment with Allegheny Ludlum. 
Since the Commonwealth was not the employer here, it was 
obviously not in a position to reinstate the steelworkers. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs prayed for an equitable award of "front 
pay" as their remedy.  The district court correctly held that 
plaintiffs' § 1983 "front pay" claims were barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.   
 The Supreme Court has held that States are not "persons" 
within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, cannot be among 
those held liable for violations of the civil rights statute. 
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 
S.Ct. 2304, 2309, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ("Section 1983 provides a 
federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but 
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it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a 
remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil 
liberties.").  Since Congress expressed no intention of 
disturbing the states' sovereign immunity in enacting § 1983, 
these suits, when brought against a state, are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 2310; Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-346, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144-1148, 59 
L.Ed.2d 358 (1979).  Accordingly, plaintiffs' claims for "front 
pay" must fail. 
 The analysis under the Eleventh Amendment in a § 1983 suit 
is less straightforward, however, when a state official (as 
opposed to the state itself) is named as defendant.  Papasan v. 
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2939, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 
(1986).  In Will, the Supreme Court held that state officials 
acting in their official capacities are not "persons" under 
§1983.  491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312 ("A suit against a 
state official in his or her official capacity. . .is no 
different from a suit against the State itself.").  Nevertheless, 
in certain circumstances, those officials may still be subject to 
federal suit, despite the Eleventh Amendment, under the narrow 
exception of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 
714 (1908).   
     In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not bar a federal court action to enjoin the 
Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a state statute 
claimed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  209 U.S. at 166-
168; 28 S.Ct. at 456-457.  The only relief awarded in Ex parte 
16 
Young was prospective, injunctive relief; requiring the Attorney 
General to conform his future, official conduct to the dictates 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court reasoned that the 
actions of a state official taken pursuant to an unconstitutional 
state enactment could not be regarded as "official or 
representative" since the underlying state authorization for 
these actions would be void under the Constitution.  Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. at 160, 28 S.Ct. at 454 ("If the act which the 
state attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of the 
Federal Constitution. . .he is in that case stripped of his 
official or representative character. . .").  Accordingly, the 
state official, although formally acting in an official or 
representative capacity, may nevertheless be sued in federal 
court.    
 The applicability of Ex parte Young has been tailored by the 
Supreme Court "to conform as precisely as possible to those 
specific situations in which it is necessary to permit the 
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state 
officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United 
States." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277, 106 S.Ct. at 2940 (citing 
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105, 104 S.Ct. at 910).     
 Young has been focused on cases in which a violation of 
     federal law by a state official is ongoing as opposed to 
     cases in which federal law has been violated at one time or 
 over a period of time in the past as well as on cases 
 in which the relief against the state official directly 
     ends the violation of federal law as opposed to cases in 
     which that relief is intended indirectly to encourage 
 compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly 
     to meet third-party interests such as compensation. 
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Papasan, 478 U.S. at 277-278, 106 S.Ct. at 2940.  Accordingly, 
relief that essentially serves to compensate a party injured in 
the past by the action of a state official, even though styled as 
something else, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  See e.g., 
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 426, 88 L.Ed.2d 
371 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-668, 94 S.Ct. 
1347, 1356-1358, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).  On the other hand, 
"relief that serves directly to bring an end to a present, 
continuing violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary 
effect on the state treasury."  Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278, 106 
S.Ct. at 2940 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-290, 
97 S.Ct. 2749, 2761-2762, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); Edelman, 415 
U.S. at 667-668, 94 S.Ct. at 1357-1358).     
 In the instant case, appellants characterize their § 1983 
actions as equitable claims for prospective relief only, i.e., 
"front pay" damages, but that label is of no importance.  This 
Court must look to the substance rather than the form of the 
relief requested to determine whether appellants' claims are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279, 106 
S.Ct. at 2940-2941.   
 In their complaint, plaintiffs' § 1983 "front pay" claims 
targeted the official acts of Job Service employees in 
administering the GATB and assisting in the hiring of employees 
for the Allegheny Ludlum facility.  Complaint, ¶ 110-120, 143-
144.  In pressing those claims before this Court, counsel for 
appellants argues that "the GATB posed an unconstitutional bar to 
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[the steelworkers'] employment. . .[and] harmed them in that they 
did not receive jobs with Allegheny Ludlum."  Appellant's Brief 
at 39.   
 We find appellants' § 1983 "front pay" claims to be neither 
prospective nor equitable as they have been presented to this 
court.  Appellants' specific allegations target past conduct, and 
the "front pay" remedy is not intended to halt a present, 
continuing violation of federal law.  Rather than vindicating 
federal rights by holding state officials accountable to the 
Constitution, we believe that "front pay" relief, under the 
circumstances of this case, would provide nothing more than 
compensatory damages which would have to be paid from the 
Commonwealth's coffers.  Plaintiffs' request for "front pay" does 
not, therefore, fall within the boundaries of permissible relief 
defined by  Ex Parte Young and we therefore affirm the district 
court's holding that these claims are barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
 
C.   
 Finally, plaintiffs advanced claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the Commonwealth and various of its 
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Plaintiffs requested the 
district court "to both declare the administration of the GATB 
test unlawful and enjoin the Commonwealth from any further 
administration of it."  Appellant's Brief at 42.  After reviewing 
plaintiffs' sealed settlement agreement with Allegheny Ludlum and 
the USWA, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had 
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already attained all the relief sought in this litigation, and it 
dismissed these claims as moot.  Appellants argue that they have 
a sufficiently cognizable interest in the continuing adverse 
impact of the GATB to satisfy the requirements for standing on 
their declaratory and injunctive claims. They suggest: 
 Appellants' GATB scores will follow them all of 
     the days of their lives, and throughout the course 
     of their working lives, unless Commonwealth's use 
     of the GATB test is enjoined. 
 
     Appellants may not be able to work in the future 
     because their GATB results may preclude them 
     getting a job.  The test results become part of  
 their records. . .and cannot be changed. 
 
Appellants' Brief at 43-44.  Appellants claim that poor GATB 
results are "much like a scarlet letter."  Id. at 44.  However, 
Hester Prynne's fall from grace does not suggest that the 
district court erred.  
 Generally speaking, a case becomes moot when the issues are 
no longer live or the parties lack a cognizable interest in the 
outcome.  Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 
1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).  Article III's "case or controversy" 
requirement prevents federal courts from deciding cases that are 
moot.  See e.g., Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3, 84 
S.Ct. 391, 394 n.3, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1964).  If developments occur 
during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's 
personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from 
being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 
dismissed as moot.  See e.g., Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216, 
1224 (3d Cir. 1993); Brock v. International Union, UAW, 889 F.2d 
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685 (6th Cir. 1989);  United States Parole Commission v. 
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1209, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 
(1980) (The interest required of a litigant to maintain a claim 
under the mootness doctrine is the same as that required to 
attain standing). 
 The ultimate question before us is whether appellants' 
declaratory and injunctive claims pertaining to the 
Commonwealth's administration of the GATB have been rendered too 
speculative, hypothetical or abstract to warrant further judicial 
review.  "Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself 
show a present case or controversy. . .if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects."  O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). 
Accordingly, in the aftermath of the steelworkers' settlement 
agreement with Allegheny Ludlum and the USWA, appellants must 
demonstrate some injury, or threat thereof, "of sufficient 
immediacy and ripeness to warrant judicial intervention."  See 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 516, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2214, 45 
L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).  This determination "depends in large part on 
a uniquely individualized process. . .centered on the facts and 
parties of each case."  See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER:  FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3533.5 (1984). 
 We believe adjudication of appellants' remaining declaratory 
and injunctive claims is not only barred by Article III but 
foreclosed by prudential concerns as well.  In the district 
court, appellants adduced evidence that GATB results become part 
of an employee's permanent record and that more than one thousand 
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Pennsylvania employers, including numerous steel companies, 
utilize the exam as an important job screening device.  Moreover, 
evidence indicated that one appellant, Richard Farah, may not 
have been hired in the past by a steel company which utilizes the 
GATB to screen applicants.6  Accordingly, appellants argue that 
continued use of the exam would engender a cognizable danger of 
future harm in the Pennsylvania job market. 
 Under the totality of circumstances here, we cannot agree. 
In Warth, the Supreme Court addressed the intervention of an 
association of construction firms in a suit in which the 
plaintiffs alleged that a town's zoning ordinance violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The association claimed that the ordinance 
deprived some of its members of business opportunities and 
revenues.  The Court reasoned as follows in finding that the 
association lacked standing:  
 The complaint refers to no specific project of any 
 of [the association's] members that is currently 
 precluded. . .There is no averment that any member 
 has applied to respondents for a building permit or 
 a variance. . .Indeed, there is no indication that 
 respondents have delayed or thwarted any project 
 currently proposed by [the association's] members 
 . . . 
 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 516, 95 S.Ct. at 2214. 
 In the instant case, none of the appellants claim a present 
injury from the Commonwealth's administration of the GATB.7  No 
                     
6
       Mr. Farah was subsequently hired by Allegheny Ludlum 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.  
 
7
       Although appellants do not specifically advance such an 
argument, it may be suggested that appellants suffer a present 
injury from the Commonwealth's continued use of the GATB in the 
form of diminished career expectations.  We need decide whether 
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appellant claims to be seeking a job in Pennsylvania that would 
require the GATB.  Moreover, it appears that Richard Cook, the 
only appellant to have an active registration with the appellee 
Commonwealth Job Service was referred to a job opening.  In 
short, there is no hint in the record of any present or imminent 
future harm from the Commonwealth's alleged conduct.  Any 
relevant injury that may befall any of the appellants is 
contingent upon a host of occurrences, each of which is just too 
speculative to fulfill the requirement of a present "case of 
controversy."  The record does not indicate that any of the 
appellants are currently unemployed or, for any other reason, are 
currently seeking employment.  Moreover, to be affected by the 
practice sought to be enjoined, an appellant seeking employment 
would have to seek it in Pennsylvania, register with the 
Commonwealth Job Service and apply for a position that requires 
the GATB.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that 
claims predicated upon such speculative contingencies afford no 
basis for finding the existence of a continuing controversy as 
required by Article III.  See e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 
371-73, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604-05, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 n.5, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1707 n.5, 40 
L.Ed.2d 164 (1974).  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that 
appellants have demonstrated any injury, or threat thereof, "of 
                                                                  
such an abstract expectation can give rise to a "case or 
controversy." See e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-227, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2930-2935, 41 
L.Ed.2d 706 (1974) (Discussing the distinction between injury in 
the abstract, which does not confer standing, and concrete 
injury).    
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sufficient immediacy and ripeness" to satisfy the jurisdictional 
requirements of the federal courts. Warth 422 U.S. at 516, 95 
S.Ct. at 2214.     Moreover, even if appellants' remaining 
claims were not constitutionally moot, this Court would have 
ample reason to exercise its discretionary power to withhold the 
requested relief on prudential grounds.  "The discretionary power 
to withhold injunctive and declaratory relief for prudential 
reasons, even in a case not constitutionally moot, is well 
established."  S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 
1987); see also, United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 73 
S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. 
v. U.S., 368 U.S. 324, 82 S.Ct. 337, 7 L.Ed.2d 317 (1961).  For 
many of the same reasons articulated by the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Spangler, we believe prudence would require this 
Court to withhold any declaratory or injunctive relief under the 
present circumstances.   In Spangler, the parents of two 
handicapped children brought a § 1983 action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the North Carolina State Board of 
Education for the refusal of its hearing officers to award 
tuition reimbursements as a remedy for violations of the 
Education of Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. ("EHA"). 
The district court granted the parents' motion for summary 
judgment.  While the appeal was pending, the parents reached a 
settlement agreement with the Asheboro City Board of Education. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the parents dismissed all their 
claims against the City Board in return for the City Board's 
agreement to pay their accrued tuition expenses.  The State Board 
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was not a party to the agreement.  Nevertheless, in light of the 
change in circumstances, the court concluded that the parents' 
remaining declaratory and injunctive claims against the State 
Board should be treated as moot for prudential reasons. Spangler, 
832 F.2d at 297.        
 The court reached this result for three reasons.  First, 
since the parents had already received tuition reimbursement for 
all past tuition expenses incurred and were not currently paying 
tuition that was subject to reimbursement because of the 
placement of their children in an acceptable public school 
program, they had no imminent need for a hearing on entitlement 
to tuition reimbursement.  Id. at 297.  Second, the presence of 
complicated and sensitive Eleventh Amendment issues persuaded the 
court that it "would be imprudent to address the merits of this 
appeal now that the basic claim. . .ha[d] been settled."  Id. at 
298.  Finally, the court believed that the issues raised did not 
require immediate resolution as "capable of repetition yet likely 
to evade review."  Id. at 298.  Accordingly, the court exercised 
its discretionary power to treat the appeal as moot on prudential 
grounds. 
 In the instant appeal, we are presented with similar 
Eleventh Amendment concerns in the context of a case in which 
reinstatement and/or compensatory damages -- the ultimate object 
of the steelworkers' underlying action -- has already been 
supplied by virtue of a settlement agreement.  Consequently, we 
believe that resolution of this sensitive constitutional question 
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would be better left to a court presented with a more concrete 
and immediate dispute.    
 Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's conclusion 
that plaintiffs' declaratory and injunctive relief claims against 
the Commonwealth and various of its officials under § 1983 are 
moot. 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
district court.       
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